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YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT
Michael Avery*
INTRODUCTION
Everyone who watches television knows that when someone is
arrested, the police have to "Mirandize"1 the suspect by reading his
rights to him and that one of those rights is the "right to remain
silent." The general public also knows that the suspect has the
right to see a lawyer.2 Of course, in crime dramas these rights are
often violated, but no one questions that they exist. As we also
know, however, truth is often stranger than fiction; hence, the
question of whether a person in police custody really does have the
right to remain silent is now before the United States Supreme
Court.
The Supreme Court will decide in the October 2002, term
whether there is a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 19833 based on
a coercive police interrogation of a suspect in custody who has not
been given Miranda warnings. The Court granted certiorari,4 and
will review the Ninth Circuit's holding in Martinez v. City of Ox-
* Associate Professor, Suffolk Law School; B.A., Yale College; LL.B., Yale Law
School. The Author appreciates the advice of Professor Susan Klein, University of
Texas Law School with respect to Fifth Amendment issues and the assistance of his
colleague Professor Marie Ashe. The assistance of the Deans of Suffolk Law School
with summer writing stipends made this work possible. The Author assisted in the
preparation of the amicus brief for the National Police Accountability Project of the
National Lawyers Guild and the National Black Police Association in Chavez v. Mar-
tinez, No. 01-1444 in the United States Supreme Court.
1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 486 (1966).
2. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443
(2000), that "Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point
where the warnings have become part of our national culture."
3. The statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress. For the purpose of this section, any Act of Congress applicable ex-
clusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of
the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
4. Martinez v. Chavez, 270 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 2326
(June 3, 2002) (No. 01-1444).
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nard,5 that the plaintiff in that case did allege actionable claims
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments on the basis of such
police conduct. The issue raised in Martinez has been the subject
of several lower federal court decisions and has caused considera-
ble confusion in those cases.6 The facts and procedural history of
Martinez establish a basis for analysis of the nature and scope of
the constitutional rights of the suspect in custody who is subjected
to coercive interrogation methods.
On November 28, 1997, Oliverio Martinez was shot five times
during an altercation with Oxnard, California police officers.7 He
was arrested and taken to a hospital emergency room." One bullet
rendered Martinez blind, having damaged his optic nerve; another
fractured a vertebra, paralyzing his legs. 9 Three additional bullets
passed through his leg around the knee joint.'0 The injuries were
life-threatening, and Martinez drifted in and out of consciousness
during medical treatment."
Without first reciting the Miranda warnings, police Sergeant Ben
Chavez questioned Martinez while he was receiving treatment in
the emergency room.1 2 Medical staff asked Chavez to leave the
room several times, but each time he returned and resumed his
questioning."' Chavez tape-recorded the questioning, which
amounted to ten minutes over a forty-five minute period.14 The
court of appeals noted that Chavez "pressed Martinez with persis-
tent, directed questions regarding the events leading up the shoot-
ing. "'15 Based on the tape recording of the questioning, the District
Court concluded that "[d]uring the questioning at the hospital,
[Martinez] repeatedly begged for treatment; he told [Sergeant Cha-
5. Id.
6. See cases cited infra Part III.
7. The circumstances of the altercation and the shooting were contested. Marti-
nez, 270 F.3d at 854. The officers had discovered a knife in Martinez's waistband
during a pat-down frisk and were handcuffing him when a struggle ensued. Id. The
officers maintained that Martinez had taken an officer's gun and pointed it at them.
Id. Martinez, however, claimed that the officer began to draw his own gun, and that
he grabbed the officer's hand to prevent him from doing so. Id. In any event, the
officer shouted, "He's got my gun," and a fellow officer then fired several shots at
Martinez. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 855.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 854-55.
15. Id. at 855.
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vez] he believed he was dying eight times; complained that he was
in extreme pain on fourteen separate occasions; and twice said he
did not want to talk any more."16 The sergeant stopped attempting
to question Martinez only when hospital staff moved him out of the
emergency room for a C.A.T. scan.' 7
While most of Martinez's responses to Chavez's questions were
non-responsive and consisted of complaints of pain and expres-
sions of belief that he was dying,"8 the court of appeals concluded
that Martinez did "utter statements that the plaintiff could reason-
ably believe might be used in a criminal prosecution or lead to evi-
dence that might be so used."' 9 The statements, however, were
not, in fact, introduced against Martinez in any criminal proceed-
ing. The question presented by the case, then, is whether a sus-
pect's constitutional rights are violated by the conduct of police
during a coercive interrogation, or are violated only in the event
that an incriminating statement is taken and introduced against
him in a trial or other criminal proceeding.
There are three potential claims that a custodial suspect who has
been subjected to coercive interrogation might make. First, such
police conduct might be considered to violate the suspect's Fifth
Amendment right not to be compelled to incriminate himself.20
Second, it could be argued that such police overreaching violates a
suspect's Fourteenth Amendment due process right not to make
involuntary statements.21 Third, it might be argued that this form
of police abuse constitutes a substantive due process violation
under the Fourteenth Amendment as a result of police abuse that
"shocks the conscience. ' 22
In Martinez, the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff had al-
leged viable Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment invol-
untariness claims on the basis of police coercion of a potentially
incriminating statement.23 The court also held that a reasonable
officer would have known that his conduct under the circumstances
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 857.
20. The Fifth Amendment provides that "No person ... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286
(1936).
22. The Court recently reaffirmed that substantive due process protects against
some forms of police misconduct in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 855
(1998).
23. Martinez, 270 F.3d at 856-57.
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violated these clearly established constitutional rights. For these
reasons the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's denial of
the sergeant's motion for summary judgment based on the doctrine
of qualified immunity.24
Chavez argues in the Supreme Court that neither the Fifth
Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right of
a person in police custody to be free from interrogation methods
that coerce an involuntary statement.2 5 Chavez argues that the
only protection these rights provide is protection from the intro-
duction of involuntary statements in evidence at a criminal trial.
He argues that the only right that protects a suspect in custody
during interrogation is a limited Fourteenth Amendment right to
be free from practices that violate substantive due process by
shocking the conscience.26 Chavez contends that there is no consti-
24. Id. at 858. With respect to qualified immunity, see Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635 (1987); MICHAEL AVERY ET AL., POLICE MISCONDUCT: LAW AND LITIGA-
TION ch. 3 (2002).
25. Brief for Petitioner at 7-8, Chavez v. Martinez, 122 S. Ct. 2326 (2002) (No. 01-
1444). Petitioner Chavez is supported by amicus briefs filed by the United States, the
State of California, the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, the National Association
of Police Organizations, and fifty California cities. Respondent Martinez is also sup-
ported by several amici, including the National Police Accountability Project of the
National Lawyers Guild, the National Black Police Association, the American Civil
Liberties Union ("ACLU"), and the California Attorneys for Criminal Justice
("CACJ").
26. Brief for Petitioner at 8, Martinez (No. 01-1444). If the only remedy available
is a substantive due process claim, the circumstances under which constitutional viola-
tions will be found will be dramatically narrowed because of the necessity of demon-
strating that the police conduct was "shocking to the conscience." This standard of
proof originated in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), where the Supreme
Court held that the forced stomach pumping of a suspect was shocking to the con-
science and a violation of substantive due process rights. Id. at 172. In Lewis, the
Court affirmed that there is a cause of action under § 1983 for substantive due process
violations, and that to constitute this constitutional violation the conduct in question
must be shocking to the conscience. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 833. The Court acknowl-
edged, however, that there is "no calibrated yard stick" to measure what is conscience
shocking. Id. at 847. The Court noted that proof of negligence is never sufficient to
meet this standard of liability, while proof of "conduct intended to injure in some way
unjustifiable by any government interest" would be most likely to meet the standard.
Id. at 848-49. The Court held that for police officers to be held liable for injuries
caused during a high-speed pursuit, a plaintiff must prove that the officers acted with
intent to harm the plaintiff. Id. at 853-54. This is a test that can seldom be met, and
its adoption means that persons injured during high-speed police chases have a cause
of action against the police in theory, but not in practice. The stringency of this stan-
dard of proof is demonstrated by the fact that the Court in Lewis acknowledged that
plaintiff's claim that the officers acted with "a reckless disregard for life" was not
sufficient to establish a violation. Id. at 854. Under the Lewis analysis, defining the
level of culpability required to meet the shocks the conscience standard is not simple,
and depends upon the governmental interests asserted to justify an official's actions
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tutionally protected right to remain silent when questioned by po-
lice or other government officials other than during questioning
that takes place at a criminal proceeding.27
The thesis of this Article is that coercive police interrogation by
itself causes a constitutional violation that should be actionable
pursuant to § 1983. It argues that the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments do protect an individual in police custody from coer-
cive interrogation, because the constitutional right not to incrimi-
nate oneself is a substantive right.28 This right is not merely a "trial
right" that may be invoked only during criminal proceedings. Nor
is the right limited to extreme cases where police abuse shocks the
conscience. Recognition that there is a cause of action under
§ 1983 for damages caused by violations of this right is crucially
important for deterrence of police misconduct.
In Part I, this Article examines United States Supreme Court
case law that supports the argument that the "right to remain si-
lent" is substantive and expansive. It provides an overview of cases
that have established that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
are violated whenever state officials coerce from a person a state-
ment that has a tendency to incriminate him. It also discusses cases
that demonstrate the existence of a "right to remain silent" that
applies in a broader range of circumstances than criminal
proceedings.
Part II considers a variety of holdings and dicta that, if miscon-
strued, might be read as contradicting the Article's thesis. It in-
cludes a review of Supreme Court decisions that have focused on
and whether the government actor has time for deliberation before acting, or is re-
quired to engage in rapid decision-making. The Court has not had an occasion to
determine what level of culpability would meet the standard in a coercive interroga-
tion case, or to canvass what governmental interests might justify extracting an invol-
untary statement from a suspect. (It should be noted that in New York v. Quarles, 467
U.S. 649 (1984), the Court did recognize a "public safety" exception to the require-
ment that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect's answers may be admitted into
evidence. Id. at 655-56.) If the Court were to employ the "intent to harm" standard
adopted in Lewis, it might be argued that an officer who intentionally coerces an
involuntary statement from a suspect possesses the requisite intent to harm. On the
other hand, given that the Court has not determined what governmental interests it
might deem adequate to justify such conduct, whether any meaningful remedy would
be provided by a substantive due process cause of action is speculative.
27. Brief for Petitioner at 13, Martinez (No. 01-1444).
28. The thesis of this Article is in complete disagreement with Professor Steven
Clymer's argument regarding the Fifth Amendment. See Steven D. Clymer, Are Po-
lice Free to Disregard Miranda?, 112 YALE L.J. 447, 449-50 (2002). Clymer takes the
position that the government can violate the Fifth Amendment only when a com-
pelled statement is introduced in evidence in a criminal case. Id. at 450. He has con-
cluded that, "the Fifth Amendment privilege is simply an exclusionary rule." Id.
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the text of the Fifth Amendment and discusses the holding and
dicta in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.2 9 It concludes that
these decisions do not require reading the self-incrimination clause
as applicable only to statements compelled or introduced during
trial. This Part also includes an examination of cases exploring the
implications of the governmental right to compel testimony by of-
fering immunity, which cases prompt the conclusion that govern-
mental power does not contradict-but in fact presupposes-the
existence of a substantive "right to remain silent."
Part III presents a review of § 1983 decisions from the courts of
appeals and demonstrates that the confusion and contradiction evi-
dent in these decisions establish a need for the Supreme Court to
reaffirm in a clear voice that there is a meaningful constitutionally
protected and enforceable "right to remain silent."
The Article concludes that recognition of a remedy under § 1983
for coercive interrogation practices is essential to safeguard the
constitutionally protected right to remain silent.
I. THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
AGAINST GOVERNMENTAL COERCION OF SELF-
INCRIMINATORY STATEMENTS: UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT CASES
A review of Supreme Court authority demonstrates that both
the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination and the
Fourteenth Amendment due process protection against coerced in-
voluntary statements establish constitutional rights that may be vi-
olated during interrogation. The argument that these rights may be
violated only during trial proceedings is not supported by the case
law.
A. History of Fifth Amendment Protections
In Brain v. United States,3" in the late nineteenth century, the
Supreme Court held that in federal prosecutions the Fifth Amend-
ment requires that an involuntary statement taken from a suspect
in custody must be excluded from evidence. The Court traced at
length the development, before and after the adoption of the Fifth
Amendment, of the proscription against involuntary confessions in
England 31 and in American courts. The Court indicated that it had
29. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
30. 168 U.S. 532 (1897) (holding inadmissible a statement by the defendant to the
police on the ground that it was not voluntary).
31. Id. at 543-57.
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found the English experience singularly instructive, because the
Fifth Amendment had:
contemplated perpetuating, in their full efficacy, by means of a
constitutional provision, principles of humanity and civil liberty
which had been secured in the mother country only after years
of struggle, so as to implant them in our institutions in the full-
ness of their integrity, free from the possibilities of future legis-
lative change.32
The Court's historical discussion in Brain points to common law
decisions in England in the early 19th century that established that
the privilege against self-incrimination included a right to remain
silent during interrogation. The Court noted that even where a
magistrate's examination of a prisoner was conducted without
prior administration of an oath, the examination could not be in-
troduced in evidence unless the accused "was made to understand
that it was optional with him to make a statement."33 Indeed, an
early English form of "Miranda" warnings was required by statute:
The judicial rule as to caution was finally embodied into positive
law by the statute of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, where, by section 18,
the magistrate was directed, after having read or caused to be
read to the accused the depositions against him, to ask the ac-
cused: "Having heard the evidence, do you wish to say anything
in answer to the charge? You are not obliged to say anything
unless you desire to do so, but whatever you say will be taken
down in writing, and may be given in evidence against you upon
your trial."3 4
The Brain Court explained, writing in 1897, that English history
subsequent to the American Revolution is also important for un-
derstanding the scope of Fifth Amendment protection, because, in
pertinent respects, the rule as to confessions by an accused "is in
England today what it was prior to and at the adoption of the Fifth
Amendment. '35
In Brown v. Mississippi,36 in 1936, the Supreme Court held that
in state prosecutions the Fourteenth Amendment due process
clause requires that an involuntary statement taken from a suspect
in custody must be excluded from evidence. The Court condemned
32. Id. at 544.
33. Id. at 550 (citing Reg. v. Arnold, 8 Car. & P. 621 (1838); Rex. v. Green, 5 Car.
& P. 322 (1833)).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 557.
36. 297 U.S. 278 (1936). The case involved the hanging and whipping of African-
American defendants to secure confessions.
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the methods used to coerce confessions from the defendants in
harsh language that evoked the historical abuses that led to the
adoption of the Fifth Amendment.37 In 2000, in Dickerson v.
United States, the Supreme Court noted the continuing applicabil-
ity of the due process voluntariness test of Brown and its progeny,
and the requirement of the exclusion of confessions that were ob-
tained involuntarily.38 Due process is violated where a defendant's
will is overborne by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a
confession.39 The test takes into consideration "the totality of all
the surrounding circumstances-both the characteristics of the ac-
cused and the details of the interrogation. 4 0
41In Malloy v. Hogan, in 1964, the Supreme Court held that the
Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause was incorporated in
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and applies
to the states. The decision requires that states observe the right "of
a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfet-
tered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty ... for such
silence. '4 2 Miranda followed immediately on the heels of Malloy.
Between the Brown decision in 1936, and the decision in Escobedo
v. Illinois4 3 in 1964, the Court had reviewed some thirty voluntari-
ness cases under the totality of the circumstances test.an In Mi-
randa, the Court recognized that there was "coercion inherent in
custodial interrogation," and it therefore established "concrete
constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts
to follow. '45
37. Id. at 285-86.
Because a state may dispense with a jury trial, it does not follow that it may
substitute trial by ordeal. The rack and torture chamber may not be substi-
tuted for the witness stand .... It would be difficult to conceive of methods
more revolting to the sense of justice than those taken to procure the confes-
sions of these petitioners, and the use of the confessions thus obtained as the
basis for conviction and sentence was a clear denial of due process.
Id.
38. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000). In Dickerson, the Court
reviewed the history of Supreme Court protection of the right against compulsory
self-incrimination. Id. at 433-35.
39. Id. at 434.
40. Id. (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)).
41. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
42. Id. at 8.
43. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
44. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434.
45. Id. at 435 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439, 442 (1966)).
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B. The "Penalty" Cases
Contemporaneous with the Supreme Court's struggle with the
need to find an effective mechanism for securing the right to re-
main silent during custodial interrogation, a series of cases was
making its way to the Court which would establish that the right to
remain silent enjoys constitutional protection in other settings as
well. In these cases, the Court established that the government
may not impose certain non-criminal penalties against those who
refuse to make statements which could incriminate them in inde-
pendent criminal proceedings. Just three years after the Malloy de-
cision, the Court decided Spevack v. Klein,46 where an attorney
declined to answer questions and furnish records during a state bar
disciplinary proceeding on self-incrimination grounds and was dis-
barred.47 The Supreme Court held that he could not be disbarred
for exercising his Fifth Amendment rights, squarely resting the de-
cision on the recognition of the right to remain silent in Malloy v.
Hogan.48
The Court reached a similar result in Uniformed Sanitation Men
Association, Inc. v. Commissioner of Sanitation of New York.49 In
that case, city workers had been dismissed after refusing to answer
questions concerning not charging and misappropriating fees, on
the ground that their answers might incriminate them.50 The Court
held that they were entitled to sue for reinstatement.1 In so doing,
the Court declared that the workers had been "entitled to remain
silent" during their employment hearings where their answers to
questions could have been used to prosecute them criminally.52
Additionally, in Lefkowitz v. Turley,53 the Court struck down as
unconstitutional a statute that cancelled existing contracts and pre-
cluded future awards of government contracts to any person who
refused to answer questions concerning a contract with the state.54
The Court held that such answers could not be compelled, absent a
grant of immunity from prosecution, by imposing the penalty of
46. 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
47. Id. at 513.
48. Id. at 514.
49. 392 U.S. 280 (1968).
50. Id. at 281-82.
51. Id. at 285.
52. Id. at 284.
53. 414 U.S. 70 (1973).
54. Id. at 84-85.
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disqualification from government contracting. And, in Lefkowitz
v. Cunningham,56 the Court held that a political party officer could
not be removed from his position by the state and barred from
holding party or public office because he had refused to waive his
privilege against self-incrimination. 57 Again, the Court made clear
that the Fifth Amendment is violated at the moment when the
statement is compelled: "When a state compels testimony by
threatening to inflict potent sanctions unless the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination is surrendered, that testimony is
obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment and cannot be used
against the declarant in a subsequent criminal prosecution."58
In each of these cases, the Supreme Court might have ruled that
no Fifth Amendment constitutional violation had occurred because
the person questioned had made no statement, and no statement
had been introduced against him in a criminal proceeding. If the
Fifth Amendment were only a "trial right" there would be no con-
stitutional justification for relief in these cases where no trial had
commenced. The Court did not take that path, however, but in-
stead held, as the Court characterized it in Minnesota v. Murphy,
that "the state could not constitutionally make good on its prior
threat" to impose a penalty for the assertion of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege. 59
Most recently, in McKune v. Lile,60 the Court again reiterated
that state actions that compel incriminating statements violate the
55. The Court reasoned that the result was compelled by the 1924 case of McCar-
thy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924) and concluded:
The [Fifth] Amendment not only protects the individual against being invol-
untarily called as a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution but also
privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any other pro-
ceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might in-
criminate him in future criminal proceedings.
Turley, 414 U.S. at 77.
56. 431 U.S. 801 (1977).
57. Id. at 809.
58. Id. at 805 (emphasis added).
59. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 434 (1984). The lack of any "trial right"
limitation on enforcing the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination is
also demonstrated by the holding in Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248 (1983), that
a judge may not hold a nonparty deponent in contempt for asserting the Fifth Amend-
ment in a civil deposition. Id. at 263. The party seeking to hold the witness in con-
tempt had argued that the questions and expected answers tracked the witness's prior
immunized grand jury testimony, and that the privilege did not apply. Id. at 255. The
Court held that there was no duly authorized assurance of immunity for the deposi-
tion testimony, and that the witness could not be compelled to answer deposition
questions to which he asserted the Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. at 263.
60. 122 S. Ct. 2017 (2002).
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Constitution and may be enjoined.61 The McKune plaintiff claimed
that the Kansas sexual offender treatment program violated his
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by requiring him
to admit his responsibility for a rape for which he had been con-
victed, and by requiring that he provide to program officials a de-
tailed sexual history.62 Pursuant to the relevant Kansas statute,
statements made by a prisoner to comply with this requirement
were not privileged and the prisoner was not offered immunity in
connection with his answers. 63 At the same time, the failure to pro-
vide the requested information would result in the loss of privi-
leges.64 The Court began its inquiry by noting that if the program
amounted to compulsion, it would have to be terminated in its ex-
tant form.65
McKune is also significant because of its reasoning that the plain-
tiff's status as a convicted prisoner would have to be taken into
account in determining whether the penalty imposed for refusing
to provide the requested information would render any statements
"compelled. '66 This indicates the Court's recognition that the con-
stitutional violation takes place at the time a statement is compelled,
rather than at some later time when the statement might be used
against a defendant in possible criminal proceedings. The Court
stressed the significance and singularity of imprisonment, empha-
sizing that "a convicted felon's life in prison differs from that of an
ordinary citizen," and that "lawful conviction and incarceration
necessarily place limitations on the exercise of a defendant's privi-
lege against self-incrimination. 67
C. Involuntariness Cases
Any argument that Fourteenth Amendment due process rights
are violated only if an involuntary confession is introduced at trial
is sharply at odds with the development of the involuntariness doc-
61. Id. at 2024.
62. Id. at 2023.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. "So the central question becomes whether the State's program, and the conse-
quences for nonparticipation in it, combine to create a compulsion that encumbers the
constitutional right. If there is compulsion, the State cannot continue the program in
its present form ...." Id. at 2025. The Court also noted that because the federal sex
offender treatment program was similar to that of Kansas, if the challenge to the
Kansas program were sustained, "the constitutionality of the federal program would
be cast into serious doubt." Id. at 2031.
66. Id. at 2026.
67. Id. at 2027.
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trine in Supreme Court cases. In Spano v. New York,6" for exam-
ple, the Court clearly demonstrated that the dictates of the
Fourteenth Amendment constrain actions that may be taken by po-
lice during interrogations, not merely the actions of judges during
trials:
The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions
does not turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also
turns on the deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the
law while enforcing the law; that in the end life and liberty can
be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict
those thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals them-
selves. Accordingly, the actions of police in obtaining confes-
sions have come under scrutiny in a long series of cases. Those
cases suggest that in recent years law enforcement officials have
become increasingly aware of the burden which they share,
along with our courts, in protecting fundamental rights of our
citizenry, including that portion of our citizenry suspected of
crime.69
Similarly, in Haynes v. Washington,7" the Court explicitly de-
clared that the methods employed by police to coerce a written
confession might themselves be-and in the particular case were-
"constitutionally impermissible":
[T]he coercive devices used here were designed to obtain admis-
sions which would incontrovertibly complete a case in which
there had already been obtained, by proper investigative efforts,
competent evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction. The pro-
cedures here are no less constitutionally impermissible, and per-
haps more unwarranted because so unnecessary.71
68. 360 U.S. 315 (1959). The Court held that a confession from a man who had
been questioned for eight hours during which his requests to see his attorney were
denied was involuntary. Id. at 323-24. Despite his consistent refusal to answer any
questions, the police eventually obtained a confession when the defendant's friend on
the police force falsely told defendant that the defendant's prior communication to
him was getting him in trouble, that he was worried that he would lose his job, and
that he was concerned about his pregnant wife and children. Id. at 319.
69. Id. at 320-21.
70. 373 U.S. 503 (1963). The defendant was held incommunicado for several
hours and told that he would not be able to call his wife until after he made a written
confession. Id. at 504.
71. Id. at 519. The Court also cited its earlier opinion in Rogers v. Richmond, 365
U.S. 534, 541 (1961), to the same effect:
Indeed, in many of the cases in which the command of the Due Process
Clause has compelled us to reverse state convictions involving the use of
confessions obtained by impermissible methods, independent corroborating
evidence left little doubt of the truth of what the defendant had confessed.
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Indeed, the Court discussed in some detail the need to determine
which methods of police interrogation violate the Constitution and
which do not:
We cannot blind ourselves to what experience unmistakably
teaches: that even apart from the express threat, the basic tech-
niques present here-the secret and incommunicado detention
and interrogation-are devices adapted and used to extort con-
fessions from suspects ... And, certainly, we do not mean to
suggest that all interrogation of witnesses and suspects is imper-
missible. Such questioning is undoubtedly an essential tool in
effective law enforcement. The line between proper and per-
missible police conduct and techniques and methods offensive
to due process is, at best, a difficult one to draw, particularly in
cases such as this where it is necessary to make fine judgments
as to the effect of psychologically coercive pressures and induce-
ments on the mind and will of an accused. But we cannot es-
cape the demands of judging or of making the difficult
appraisals inherent in determining whether constitutional rights
have been violated. We are here impelled to the conclusion,
from all of the facts presented, that the bounds of due process
have been exceeded.72
It is clear from this passage that the defendant's constitutional
due process rights were violated precisely by the interrogation
methods employed by the police, not merely by the later introduc-
tion of the confession into evidence.
D. The Right to Remain Silent
In Miranda, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Brain and Malloy,
again holding that the privilege against self-incrimination is appli-
cable at the stationhouse.73 The Court held, "[t]oday, then, there
can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available
outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons
in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any
significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves. 74
The most familiar legacy of Miranda, of course, is the requirement
that police officers must advise suspects prior to interrogation that,
Despite such verification, confessions were found to be the product of con-
stitutionally impermissible methods in their inducement.
Haynes, 373 U.S. at 518.
72. Haynes, 373 U.S. at 514-15 (emphasis added).
73. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
74. Id.
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"You have a right to remain silent."75 For thirty-six years, count-
less officers have advised countless Americans at the specific direc-
tion of the Supreme Court that this is a right they possess.
Thus, the argument being advanced by Chavez in the Supreme
Court, that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, except for ex-
treme cases that "shock the conscience," apply only at trial, cannot
be accepted without concluding that the suspect in the stationhouse
in fact has no "right" to remain silent. A more appropriate warn-
ing by police officers, were the Supreme Court to conclude that the
right to remain silent did not exist prior to trial, would be some-
thing like:
There is a risk that anything you say to us might be introduced
into evidence at trial. At that time you will have an opportunity
to try to convince a judge that any statements you made to us
were involuntary. But regardless of what happens at trial, you
don't have a right not to answer our questions. And as long as
we have a sufficient governmental interest in compelling an in-
voluntary statement from you, we can make you talk, unless we
do anything that is so brutal and degrading that it is shocking to
the conscience.
In assessing whether law enforcement officers were, in effect, or-
dered by the Supreme Court in 1966 to mislead the American pub-
lic about the nature of their rights, it is important to remember that
the "right to remain silent" did not originate in Miranda, but that
Miranda clarified a well established right. The right to remain si-
lent had been recognized many times by the Supreme Court prior
to the decision in Miranda. For example, in Escobedo v. State of
Illinois,7 6 the Court referred to the suspect's "absolute right to re-
main silent" in the face of police accusations. 77 Prior to Miranda,
the Supreme Court assumed that an educated person would know
of her right to remain silent, even in the absence of any police
warning concerning the right. 78 As noted above, in making the
Fifth Amendment applicable to the states in Malloy v. Hogan, the
Supreme Court explicitly required that the state actors respect the
right to remain silent.79 The Miranda opinion itself explained that
the need to warn suspects that they have a right to remain silent
75. Id. at 444.
76. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
77. Id. at 485; see Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 631 (1961).
78. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 440 (1958) (referring to "a voluntary con-
fession by a college-educated man with law school training who knew of his right to
keep silent.").
79. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
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was essential so that suspects would have a simple awareness of a
pre-existing Fifth Amendment privilege that could be exercised by
remaining silent:
At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interro-
gation, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms
that he has the right to remain silent. For those unaware of the
privilege, the warning is needed simply to make them aware of
it-the threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its
exercise.... Further, the warning will show the individual that
his interrogators are prepared to recognize his privilege should
he choose to exercise it.80
This last sentence of this passage also makes clear that the inter-
rogators are not only required to advise the suspect of her rights,
but also are constitutionally required to honor those rights. Both
the constitutional right of a suspect in custody to remain silent and
the obligation of the police to honor this right were reaffirmed by
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Supreme Court in Dick-
erson: "Miranda requires procedures that will warn a suspect in
custody of his right to remain silent and which will assure the sus-
pect that the exercise of that right will be honored."'" The Court
described these procedures as necessary to meet the "constitu-
tional minimum. 82
The right to remain silent also encompasses the right to initiate
silence, as Miranda made clear in recognizing that one in custody
has the right to stop answering questions at any time:
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is
clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time
prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent,
the interrogation must cease . . . Without the right to cut off
questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on
the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement
after the privilege has been once invoked.83
80. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-68.
81. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 442 (2000).
82. Id. Clymer asserts that such language from the Miranda opinion merely "de-
scribes the new rules as if they are commands to police." See Clymer, supra note 28,
at 484. This is sophistry. His conclusion depends upon reading the portions of the
opinion that laid down the requirements that officers must follow during custodial
interrogation as though they were all "prefaced with the words: 'In order to obtain an
admissible statement .... "' Id. at 485. The Miranda opinion is not written in this
fashion, and if it were, it would defeat a principal purpose of the opinion, which was
to provide clear, unambiguous, and mandatory guidelines for police to follow in con-
ducting custodial interrogations.
83. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74.
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The Court has repeatedly reaffirmed this right.84
The Supreme Court has consistently described the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege as including a right to remain silent, regardless of
the context in which it is exercised. For example, it is clear that a
criminal defendant has a "right to remain silent" during a psychiat-
ric interview arranged by the state in connection with determining
future dangerousness as a factor bearing on the imposition of the
death penalty. 85 In Estelle v. Smith, the Court held not merely that
unwarned statements taken from a prisoner cannot be introduced
in evidence against him-it made clear that a defendant may not
be compelled to answer a psychiatrist's questions: "A criminal de-
fendant, who neither initiates a psychiatric evaluation nor attempts
to introduce any psychiatric evidence, may not be compelled to re-
spond to a psychiatrist if his statements can be used against him at a
capital sentencing proceeding."8 6 The Court has repeatedly char-
acterized this interest as "the right to remain silent."87
In a completely different context, the Fifth Amendment protects
a public employee's "right to remain silent" in response to ques-
tions put to her by her employer where the answer might lead to a
84. The brief of the ACLU and CACJ in Chavez v. Martinez includes the follow-
ing string of citations for this proposition:
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458 (1994) ("If a suspect requests coun-
sel at any time during the interview, he is not subject to further question-
ing."); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176-77 (1991) ("Once a suspect
asserts the right [to counsel] .... the current interrogation [must] cease.");
Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990) ("[W]hen counsel is re-
quested, interrogation must cease."); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 682
(1988) ("[A]fter a person in custody has expressed his desire to deal with the
police only through counsel, he 'is not subject to further interrogation.'")
(quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1980); Connecticut v.
Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987) ("[O]nce the accused 'states that he wants
an attorney, the interrogation must cease.'") (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at
474; Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485 (once the right to counsel is "exercised by the
accused, 'the interrogation must cease."') (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at
474); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 293 (1980) ("In Miranda [ ], the
Court held that, once a defendant in custody asks to speak with a lawyer, all
interrogation must cease until a lawyer is present.") (citation deleted); Fare
v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979) ("[A]n accused's request for an attor-
ney is per se an invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights, requiring that all
interrogation cease."); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74 ("If the individual indi-
cates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he
wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.") (footnote omitted).
Brief for ACLU at 6-7, Chavez v. Martinez, 122 S. Ct. 2326 (2002) (No. 01-1444).
85. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 461 (1981).
86. Id. at 468 (emphasis added).
87. See, e.g., Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 530 (1986).
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criminal prosecution. 88 As Chief Justice Rehnquist recently noted
for a unanimous Court in LaChance v. Erickson," "If answering
an agency's investigatory question could expose an employee to a
criminal prosecution, he may exercise his Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent."9°
E. The Right to Remain Silent as a Liberty Interest
The right to remain silent in the face of police inquiries is a lib-
erty interest both "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." 91 In addi-
tion to Fifth Amendment protection, it is secured by the Fourth
Amendment's limits on the ability of the police to seize an individ-
ual. Prior to the point at which an individual is taken into custody,
the right to remain silent is secured by a combination of Fourth and
Fifth Amendment protections. Thus, it is well established that a
person approached by a police officer on the street need not an-
swer questions posed by the officer. As Justice White wrote in
Terry v. Ohio:
I think an additional word is in order concerning the matter of
interrogation during an investigative stop. There is nothing in
the Constitution which prevents a policeman from addressing
questions to anyone on the streets. Absent special circum-
stances, the person approached may not be detained or frisked
but may refuse to cooperate and go on his way. However, given
the proper circumstances, such as those in this case, it seems to
me the person may be briefly detained against his will while per-
tinent questions are directed to him. Of course, the person
stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may not be com-
pelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest,
although it may alert the officer to the need for continued
observation.92
88. For a discussion of the penalty cases, see supra notes 49-58 and accompanying
text.
89. 522 U.S. 262 (1998).
90. Id. at 267 (emphasis added).
91. In Chavez, the Petitioner argues that the right to remain silent does not satisfy
these familiar tests from Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937), and Moore
v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977), of what constitutes a liberty interest. In-
deed, Petitioner goes so far as to argue that, "[w]hat is deeply rooted in this [Nation's]
tradition is not the right to be silent in the face of police questioning, but instead the
duty to respond to those questions." Brief for Petitioner at 31, Martinez (No. 01-
1444).
92. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring).
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Justice White's observation in Terry was frequently adopted in
later opinions. 93 In Davis v. Mississippi,94 the Court referred to
"the settled principle that while the police have the right to request
citizens to answer voluntarily questions concerning unsolved
crimes they have no right to compel them to answer."95 Further, in
Brown v. Texas,96 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a Texas
statute that made it a crime to refuse to identify one's self to a
police officer where the defendant was detained without the rea-
sonable suspicion required for an investigative detention under
Terry.
The Constitution recognizes a right to remain silent because the
coercion used to evoke self-incriminating statements-whether or
not the coercion is effective-is itself odious in a free society. The
United States Supreme Court has long recognized this principle.
In the late nineteenth century, for example, in Boyd v. United
States,97 the Court quoted Lord Camden's opinion from the eight-
eenth century British case Entick v. Carrington9" as follows: "It is
very certain that the law obliges no man to accuse himself, because
the necessary means of compelling self-accusation, falling upon the
innocent as well as the guilty, would be both cruel and unjust..." 99
The United States Supreme Court emphasized the values under-
lying the Fifth Amendment in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission
of New York Harbor,100 where it declared that the privilege against
self-incrimination reflects:
many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: ...
our preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial
system of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating state-
ments will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our
sense of fair play which dictates "a fair state-individual balance
93. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983) (Justice White's opinion
for the Court, joined in by Justices Marshall, Powell, and Stevens). As the dissenting
opinion in Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 129 n.2 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting),
noted, even a person who has fled from police officers has a right to remain silent
after being stopped.
94. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
95. Id. at 727 n.6.
96. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
97. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
98. Entick v. Carrington & Three Other King's Messengers, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029
(1765).
99. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 629. The Court further remarked, "The principles laid down
in this opinion affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security." Id. at
630.
100. 378 U.S. 52 (1964). The Court reaffirmed these values behind the Fifth
Amendment in Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 691-92 (1993).
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by requiring the government to leave the individual alone until
good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the
government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the en-
tire load;" our respect for the inviolability of the human person-
ality and of the right of each individual "to a private enclave
where he may lead a private life;" our distrust of self-depreca-
tory statements; and our realization that the privilege, while
sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to the
innocent."'1 '
In Miranda, the Court stressed that the Fifth Amendment is de-
signed to protect human dignity:
We have recently noted that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion-the essential mainstay of our adversary system-is
founded on a complex of values. All these policies point to one
overriding thought: the constitutional foundation underlying the
privilege is the respect a government-state or federal-must
accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens. To maintain a
"fair state-individual balance," to require the government "'to
shoulder the entire load," to respect the inviolability of the
human personality, our accusatory system of criminal justice de-
mands that the government seeking to punish an individual pro-
duce the evidence against him by its own independent labors,
rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from
his own mouth. 102
Recognition of the values underlying the Fifth Amendment dem-
onstrates that coercive interrogation in itself causes injuries that
the constitutional protection is intended to safeguard against. Co-
ercive interrogation, even in the absence of physical violence, and
even when it does not elicit statements later used in criminal pro-
ceedings, subjects suspects to inquisitorial methods, fear of inhu-
mane treatment, degradation of individual personality, invasion of
privacy, humiliation, and mental and emotional stress and suffer-
ing. Section 1983 provides a remedy for precisely such harms when
they have been caused by constitutional violations.103
101. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55 (citations omitted).
102. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
103. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 258-59 (1978).
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II. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS TO THE EXISTENCE OF
A RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT
A. Text of the Fifth Amendment
Some advocates of limiting the protections of the Fifth Amend-
ment to the exclusion of evidence from trials rely on the text of the
Amendment for their argument. The Fifth Amendment provides
that "no person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself."'1 4 Viewed most narrowly this language
might be taken to mean only that a defendant could not be com-
pelled to take the witness stand in her criminal trial. Given the
exclusionary rule, however, it would be hard to argue for this ex-
treme view. It has been argued, however, that the text of the
amendment compels the conclusion that where the subject of a po-
lice interview is not forced to testify in a criminal proceeding
against her, and none of her statements are introduced in any such
proceeding; there can be no violation of the Fifth Amendment.10 5
The Supreme Court has explored to what extent the text of the
Fifth Amendment limits its reach. In Pennsylvania v. Muniz, °6 for
example, in 1990, the Court made clear that a person is a "witness
against himself" when he provides the state with evidence of a
''communicative nature," and that application of the amendment is
not limited to testimony that takes place in a courtroom:
The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides
that no "person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself." Although the text does not delineate
the ways in which a person might be made a "witness against
himself," we have long held that the privilege does not protect a
suspect from being compelled by the State to produce "real or
104. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
105. See, e.g., Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1253-54 (9th Cir. 1992) (Brunetti,
J., dissenting). Clymer's argument on this point depends upon semantic cleverness
that makes a mockery of Fifth Amendment protections. He concedes that the Fifth
Amendment "operates" when there is an effort to elicit a statement, including in the
pre-trial context. See Clymer, supra note 28, at 460-65. On the other hand, Clymer
contends that the only operative effect of the Fifth Amendment in this context is to
permit a person to "assert" her rights. See id. The government, according to Clymer,
can only "violate" the Fifth Amendment if a compelled statement is introduced in
evidence in a criminal proceeding. See id. The ability to "assert" the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege, however, is limited in Clymer's view to providing notice that one will
move to suppress any coerced statements if there is a later trial, and if such statements
are offered in evidence by the prosecution. See id. The assertion of the privilege,
according to Clymer, has no force with the officers conducting the interrogation. See
id.
106. 496 U.S. 582 (1990).
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physical evidence." Rather, the privilege "protects an accused
only from being compelled to testify against himself, or other-
wise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or commu-
nicative nature." "[I]n order to be testimonial, an accused's
communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a fac-
tual assertion or disclose information. Only then is a person
compelled to be a "witness" against himself."
In Miranda v. Arizona, we reaffirmed our previous understand-
ing that the privilege against self-incrimination protects individ-
uals not only from legal compulsion to testify in a criminal
courtroom but also from "informal compulsion exerted by law-
enforcement officers during in-custody questioning. "017
The Court specifically held that custodial interrogation presents
a situation in which "self-incrimination" may be coerced, i.e.,
where a suspect may be compelled to be a "witness against
himself":
Because the privilege was designed primarily to prevent "a re-
currence of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber, even if not in
their stark brutality," it is evident that a suspect is "compelled
... to be a witness against himself" at least whenever he must
face the modern-day analog of the historic trilemma-either
during a criminal trial where a sworn witness faces the identical
three choices, or during custodial interrogation where, as we ex-
plained in Miranda, the choices are analogous and hence raise
similar concerns. 10 8
Repeating language from Miranda, the Court concluded that de-
spite the differences between courtroom testimony and custodial
interrogation, "[w]e are satisfied that all the principles embodied in
the privilege apply to informal compulsion exerted by law-enforce-
ment officers during in-custody questioning. "109
The Muniz Court relied heavily on its earlier opinion in Schmer-
ber v. California,110 where it had held that there was no Fifth
Amendment right not to have blood taken over an arrestee's ob-
107. Id. at 588-89 (footnote and citations omitted). This portion of the Court's
opinion, written by Justice Brennan, was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tices White, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy.
108. Id. at 596 (footnote and citation omitted). This portion of Justice Brennan's
opinion was joined by Justices Marshall, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. The
trilemma is the "cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt," cited in Mur-
phy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964), as an evil
against which the Fifth Amendment was intended to safeguard.
109. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 596 n.10 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461
(1966)).
110. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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jection while he was a patient in a hospital after an automobile
accident."1 In Schmerber, the Court described the scope of the
constitutional privilege with respect to communications in the
broadest possible terms: "It is clear that the protection of the privi-
lege reaches an accused's communications, whatever form they
might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also com-
munications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce
one's papers." '  Schmerber distinguished between impermissible
compulsion of "'communications' or 'testimony"' and permissible
compelling of a suspect to submit to physical examinations. 13
Even with this distinction, however, the Court emphasized the
breadth of the bar on compulsion of any form of communication
when it suggested that compelling a suspect to participate in a poly-
graph examination might violate Fifth Amendment rights. 14
B. Dictum in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez 1 5
The Supreme Court suggested that the Fifth Amendment estab-
lishes a trial right and bestows no constitutional protection during
custodial police questioning in dictum in United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez.16 In that case, the Court stated that the Fifth Amend-
ment right " . . . is a right which is properly asserted only during
trial and only by defendants in a criminal proceeding."' 1 7 To the
extent that Verdugo-Urquidez suggests that the Fifth Amendment
does not establish any rights to be free from compelled self-incrim-
ination other than at trial or in criminal proceedings, it is dictum
inconsistent with the historic teachings of the Court's Fifth Amend-
111. Id. at 764.
112. Id. at 763-64 (emphasis added). The Court cited to Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886), with respect to subpoenas of papers. The Supreme Court has aban-
doned this aspect of Boyd in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), and United
States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984), discussed infra notes 1.26-133 and accompanying
text.
113. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764.
114. The Court reasoned:
Some tests seemingly directed to obtain "physical evidence," for example, lie
detector tests measuring changes in body function during interrogation, may
actually be directed to eliciting responses which are essentially testimonial.
To compel a person to submit to testing in which an effort will be made to
determine his guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological responses,
whether willed or not, is to evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth Amend-
ment. Such situations call to mind the principle that the protection of the
privilege "is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard."
Id.
115. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
116. Id. at 264.
117. Id.
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ment jurisprudence and with specific other decisions of the Court
considering the same issue.
In Verdugo-Urquidez, the government obtained an arrest war-
rant for Verdugo-Urquidez, a Mexican citizen and resident be-
lieved to be a leader of an organization that smuggles narcotics into
the United States.118 He was apprehended by Mexican police and
transported to the United States where he was arrested by federal
police. 119 Following his arrest, Drug Enforcement Administration
("DEA") agents, working in cooperation with Mexican officials,
without a warrant, searched his Mexican residences and seized cer-
tain documents.12 0 The District Court granted the defendant's mo-
tion to suppress the evidence and the court of appeals affirmed. 12'
The Supreme Court defined the issue to be decided: "The question
presented by this case is whether the Fourth Amendment applies
to the search and seizure by United States agents of property that
is owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign
country.' '1 22
The holding of Verdugo-Urquidez was limited solely to the facts
of the search in Mexico, the Fourth Amendment, and the rights of
aliens.123 It was stated as follows:
We think that the text of the Fourth Amendment, its history,
and our cases discussing the application of the Constitution to
aliens and extraterritorially require rejection of respondent's
claim. At the time of the search, he was a citizen and resident of
Mexico with no voluntary attachment to the United States, and
the place searched was located in Mexico. Under these circum-
stances, the Fourth Amendment has no application. 124
The Court in Verdugo-Urquidez discussed whether the defen-
dant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated only by the illegal
search, or also by introduction of illegally seized evidence at
trial.125 The Court concluded that the exclusionary rule, which bars
illegally seized evidence from trial, is "a remedial question separate
from the existence vel non of the constitutional violation."' 26 Thus,
118. Id. at 262.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 263.
122. Id. at 261.
123. Id. at 264.
124. Id. at 274-75.
125. Id. at 265-75.
126. d at 264.
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the Court concluded, "if there were a constitutional violation, it
occurred solely in Mexico."'1 27
For the sake of illustration, the Court contrasted the Fourth
Amendment with the Fifth Amendment, observing that in the case
of Fifth Amendment violations, a violation clearly occurs at trial if
a coerced statement is introduced in evidence. It should be noted,
however, that the Court had no occasion to consider, even for the
purpose of the comparison it was making, whether a Fifth Amend-
ment violation can occur prior to trial. Further, the Verdugo-Ur-
quidez dictum seems to contradict earlier Supreme Court
characterization of coercive interrogation itself as constituting a
Fifth Amendment violation.
In Dunaway v. New York, 12 8 in particular, the prosecution had
argued that even if the defendant had been seized without proba-
ble cause, a statement he made during an ensuing interrogation
would be admissible if he had received Miranda warnings. 12 9 The
Supreme Court, however, held that an independent Fourth
Amendment analysis would be required, reasoning:
[A]lthough a confession after proper Miranda warnings may be
found "voluntary" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, this
type of "voluntariness" is merely a "threshold requirement" for
Fourth Amendment analysis. Indeed, if the Fifth Amendment
has been violated, the Fourth Amendment issue would not have
to be reached.13°
Given the discussion of a potential Fourth Amendment violation
here, it is clear that the Fifth Amendment violation referred to is a
violation constituted by the interrogation itself.
C. Implications of Immunity
It has been suggested by lower federal courts that the ability of
the government to compel testimony by offering immunity from
future prosecution from an unwilling witness who has asserted the
Fifth Amendment privilege, implies that there is no constitutional
bar to compelling testimony.1 3 ' What the Supreme Court has actu-
127. Id.
128. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
129. Id. at 205.
130. Id. at 217 (footnote and citations omitted).
131. See, e.g., Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 919 F.2d 1230, 1244 (7th Cir. 1990) ("As the
use immunity cases show, the government may require a suspect to speak, so long as it
does not use the results against him."), rev'd on other grounds, 502 U.S. 801 (1991);
Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 194 (7th Cir. 1989) ("The Fifth Amendment does not
forbid the forcible extraction of information but only the use of information so ex-
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ally held in Kastigar v. United States, 132 is that immunity in ex-
change for testimony is constitutional if the grant of immunity
affords protection commensurate with that afforded by the privi-
lege against compulsory self-incrimination.1 33
There is a substantial distinction between compelling testimony
through judicial grants of immunity, made in public proceedings in
proceedings affording a witness procedural due process rights, in-
cluding the right to be represented by counsel and to appeal any
perceived irregularities, and coercing statements in the back rooms
of police stations under circumstances where the suspect has been
denied the right to see his attorney. The existence of the former
recognizes, as Kastigar noted, quoting Justice Frankfurter, that im-
munity statutes have "become part of our constitutional fabric.
134
The latter is simply a lawless abuse of authority by police officers.
In United States v. Balsys, 35 the United States Supreme Court
held that the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimina-
tion does not apply when the only prosecution feared is prosecu-
tion that might occur in a foreign country. 36 Thus, the Court, in
evaluating whether there was any prospect that a subpoenaed wit-
ness's testimony could be used in a "criminal case," limited the
reach of that term in the Fifth Amendment to prosecution by the
government whose power the clause limits. 137
tracted as evidence in a criminal case-otherwise, immunity statutes would be uncon-
stitutional."). Chavez is making this argument in the Supreme Court. He argues,
"Kastigar confirms that mere coercion, even when it succeeds in eliciting otherwise
incriminating statements, does not violate the Fifth Amendment without the actual
use of the statements against the witness in a criminal case." Brief for Petitioner at
13, Chavez v. Martinez, 122 S. Ct. 2326 (June 3, 2002) (No. 01-1444).
132. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
133. Id. at 462. The Court noted in Kastigar that immunity statutes "have historical
roots deep in Anglo-American jurisprudence," indeed, predating the adoption of the
Fifth Amendment. Id. at 445 n.13.
134. Id. at 447 (quoting Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956)).
135. 524 U.S. 666 (1998). The case involved enforcement of an administrative sub-
poena by the Office of Special Investigations for testimony from an immigrant who
was suspected of having been a Nazi war criminal. Id. at 669. He had claimed the
privilege against self-incrimination, based on fear of prosecution in foreign countries.
Id.
136. Id. at 693.
137. Id. at 673-74. The Court further explained that the Fifth Amendment privilege
also requires exclusion from state prosecutions of statements compelled by the federal
government, and exclusion from federal prosecutions of statements compelled by
state officials. Id. This is a consequence of the Court's decisions in Murphy v. Water-
front Commission of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 77-78 (1964), where the Court
held that the Fifth Amendment prohibited using state testimony or its fruits to obtain
a federal conviction, and Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 12 (1964), where the Court held
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In its discussion of Murphy, the Balsys Court explained the na-
ture of the government's power to offer immunity in exchange for
testimony that would otherwise be protected by the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege:
[U]nder the Self-Incrimination Clause, the government has an
option to exchange the stated privilege for an immunity to
prosecutorial use of any compelled inculpatory testimony. The
only condition on the government when it decides to offer im-
munity in place of the privilege to stay silent is the requirement
to provide an immunity as broad as the privilege itself.138
Murphy achieved this required breadth by imposing an exclu-
sionary rule prohibiting the federal use of testimony compelled by
a state in the absence of a statute effectively providing for federal
immunity. 139
Justice Souter's opinion for the Balsys Court makes clear that
this judicially created immunity is not the primary vehicle for en-
forcing the Fifth Amendment, but is only a "fail-safe" device "to
ensure that compelled testimony is not admitted in a criminal pro-
ceeding" in the absence of a previous grant of immunity. 4 ° The
Court explained:
The general rule requires a grant of immunity prior to the com-
pelling of any testimony. We have said that the prediction that a
court in a future criminal prosecution would be obligated to pro-
tect against the evidentiary use of compelled testimony is not
enough to satisfy the privilege against compelled self-incrimina-
tion. The suggestion that a witness should rely on a subsequent
motion to suppress rather than a prior grant of immunity
"would [not] afford adequate protection. Without something
more, [the witness] would be compelled to surrender the very
protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee.' 14
1
It should be noted that this portion of Justice Souter's opinion
was joined by all the Justices except for Justices Ginsburg and
that the Fifth Amendment was applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.
138. Balsys, 524 U.S. at 682.
139. The exclusionary rule operates in both state and federal jurisdictions-"After
Murphy, the immunity option open to the Executive Branch could be exercised only
on the understanding that the state and federal jurisdictions were as one, with a feder-
ally mandated exclusionary rule filling the space between the limits of state immunity
statutes and the scope of the privilege." Id. at 683.
140. Id. at 683 n.8.
141. Id. (citations omitted).
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Breyer, who dissented, taking a broader view of the protection af-
forded by the Fifth Amendment.
Thus, Balsys makes clear that the constitutionality of compelling
testimony on the basis of a grant of immunity does not mean that
the Fifth Amendment privilege is a "trial right" only. Clearly the
"right to remain silent" is protected by the Fifth Amendment prior
to and at the time of any government attempt to compel or coerce
a statement. Like other constitutional rights, however, it is not ab-
solute and the government, at its election, may "exchange the
stated privilege for an immunity to prosecutorial use of any com-
pelled inculpatory testimony. ' 142 The Balsys characterization of
the exclusionary rule as a "fail-safe" device in immunity cases is
entirely inconsistent with the proposition that the Fifth Amend-
ment is a right that exists only at trial. In cases in which immunity
is granted to a witness with exposure to criminal charges, her exer-
cise of the right to remain silent has taken place prior to the grant
of immunity and, in the ordinary course, it is precisely the exercise
of that right that triggers the government's interest in exercising its
option to "offer immunity in place of the privilege to stay silent." '143
Indeed, the assertion of a motion to suppress in connection with
trial testimony has been explicitly described by the Court as offer-
ing inadequate protection, by itself, to protect the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege.144
United States v. Doe'4 5 is another major United States Supreme
Court case that undermines the argument that the Constitution
does not bar the compulsion of testimony. In Doe, the Court ad-
142. Id. at 682.
143. Id. Most grand jury witnesses appear before the grand jury in response to a
subpoena and exercise their right to remain silent, if they choose to do so, in response
to specific questions posed before the grand jury. The government then makes a
grant of immunity (which may necessitate obtaining permission from higher-ranking
prosecutors), and brings the witness back for a subsequent appearance before the
grand jury.
144. It is true that in a later portion of the opinion, Justice Souter does refer in a
"cf." reference, to dictum from United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264
(1990), that a Fifth Amendment "violation occurs only at trial." Balsys, 524 U.S. at
692 n.12. That language from Verdugo-Urquidez is, however, inconsistent with the
conclusion on the next page of the opinion in Balsys that although the Constitution
does not guarantee protection of "personal testimonial inviolability," it does provide
"a conditional protection of testimonial privacy subject to basics limits recognized
before the framing and refined through immunity doctrine in the intervening years."
Id. at 692-93 (footnote omitted). The footnote reference makes clear that the "basic
limits recognized before the framing" refer to the "practice of exchanging silence for
immunity ... apparently as old as the Fifth Amendment itself." Id. at 692 n.13, 693.
145. 465 U.S. 605 (1984). The case involved a motion to quash a grand jury sub-
poena of business records of a sole proprietorship. Id. at 606-07.
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dressed the question of whether the Fifth Amendment protects the
contents of an individual's tax and business records in his posses-
sion.146 The taxpayer's argument in Doe, that private books and
papers were protected by the Fifth Amendment, was based on the
Court's opinion in Boyd v. United States.147 The taxpayer argued in
Doe that "the Fifth Amendment should be read as creating a 'zone
of privacy which protects an individual and his personal records
from compelled production."' 1 48 One response to this argument
might have been that obtaining the papers by subpoena would not
violate the Fifth Amendment, and that only their introduction into
evidence in a criminal proceeding against the individual would do
so. The Court, however, did not make this argument and did not
discuss it. It held, rather, that the records were not protected by
the Fifth Amendment because the individual had prepared them
voluntarily. 149 The distinction drawn was not a distinction between
giving a person's information to the government and the use of the
information against him at trial; the distinction was perceived to be
the difference between information voluntarily generated by an in-
dividual and information compelled from him by the state. 5 °
The Doe Court, moreover, affirmed the holding of the district
court that the act of producing the documents to the government
was privileged under the Fifth Amendment-"the act of producing
the documents would involve testimonial self-incrimination. 151
The Court declined to create a doctrine of constructive "use immu-
nity," pursuant to which the government would not have been able
to use the incriminatory aspects of the act of production against the
person claiming the privilege. 152 In the discussion of that point, the
Court compared the application of the exclusionary rule on co-
erced statements with the proposed constructive "use immunity."
In so doing, the Court made clear that the exclusionary rule oper-
ates to suppress statements resulting from Fifth Amendment viola-
tions that have already occurred:
146. Id. at 606.
147. 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886).
148. Doe, 465 U.S. at 611.
149. Id. at 610.
150. The Court concluded: "Respondent does not contend that he prepared the
documents involuntarily or that the subpoena would force him to restate, repeat, or
affirm the truth of their contents .... We therefore hold that the contents of those
records are not privileged." Id. at 61.1-12 (footnotes omitted).
151. Id. at 613.
152. Id. at 616.
598
YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT
Of course, courts generally suppress compelled, incriminating
testimony that results from a violation of a witness's Fifth
Amendment rights. The difference between that situation and
the Government's theory of constructive use immunity is that in
the latter it is the grant of judicially enforceable use immunity
that compels the witness to testify. In the former situation, ex-
clusion of the witness' testimony is used to deter the govern-
ment from future violations of witnesses' Fifth Amendment
rights. 53
D. Exceptions to the Miranda Protections
There are important United States Supreme Court decisions rec-
ognizing exceptions to Miranda's warnings requirements. Al-
though statements taken in violation of the rights protected by
Miranda warnings may not be introduced in the state's case-in-
chief in a criminal trial, in Harris v. New York' 54 and Oregon v.
Hass,55 the Court held that the state may offer such statements to
impeach a defendant who testifies and contradicts statements made
during interrogation.1 5 6 In addition, in Michigan v. Tucker,157 the
Court held that Miranda does not require the suppression of the
testimony of a witness whose identity the police have learned from
a statement taken in violation of Miranda.58 Further, in Oregon v.
Elstad,5 9 the Court held that a statement given after proper Mi-
randa warnings need not be suppressed as the "fruit" of a prior
statement made during interrogation without warnings.
1 60
These cases do not compel the conclusion, however, that there is
no constitutionally protected right to remain silent. This line of
authority, as well as the Supreme Court's frequent references to
the Miranda warnings as "prophylactic," and "not themselves
rights protected by the Constitution,"'' was relied upon by the
court of appeals in Dickerson in support of the conclusion that the
153. Id. at 611 n.16 (citations omitted).
154. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
155. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
156. Hass, 420 U.S. at 723; Harris, 401 U.S. at 226.
157. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
158. Id. at 451.
159. 470 U.S. 298 (1984).
160. Id. at 307.
161. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437-38 (citing New York v. Quarles,
467 U.S. 647, 653 (1984), and Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444); see Susan R. Klein, Identifying
and (Re)formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and Incidental Rights in Con-
stitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MIcH. L. REv. 1030, 1032-33 (2001) (discussing the
role of "prophylactic rules" in constitutional criminal procedure).
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protections announced in Miranda are not constitutionally re-
quired.162 The Supreme Court in Dickerson, however, rejected the
argument that these cases implied that the protections provided by
Miranda are not constitutionally required. 63
In so doing, the Court relied upon numerous references in the
Miranda opinion to the constitutional basis for the decision. The
first such reference highlighted by the Court clearly indicates that
the constitutional rights secured by the decision apply to interroga-
tion itself:
In fact, the majority opinion is replete with statements indicat-
ing that the majority thought it was announcing a constitutional
rule. Indeed, the Court's ultimate conclusion was that the un-
warned confessions obtained in the four cases before the Court
in Miranda "were obtained from the defendant under circum-
stances that did not meet constitutional standards for protection
of the privilege., 164
The Dickerson Court concluded that the decisions limiting the
reach of Miranda did not demonstrate that it was not a constitu-
tional rule, but merely "that no constitutional rule is immuta-
ble." 165 The Court reasoned that the modifications in the Miranda
rule were made in later decisions as a normal part of constitutional
law. 166 The argument that there is no constitutionally protected
right to remain silent, however, calls for more than a modification
of the Miranda protections. Eliminating the right to remain silent
would not merely modify the constitutionally based prophylactic
162. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 687-90 (4th Cir. 1999).
163. The Court's conclusion was based "first and foremost" on the fact that Mi-
randa applied the rule it announced to proceedings in state courts, which could not be
done unless there was a constitutional basis for the rule. Id. at 688. The Court also
noted that Miranda claims may be raised on habeas corpus, which is only available
when one is held in custody in violation of the Constitution. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at
438-39.
164. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 439-40 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491
(1966)) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). The Dickerson Court also cited Butler
v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 411 (1990), for the proposition that demonstrating that the
Fifth Amendment applies during interrogation: "[T]he Fifth Amendment bars police-
initiated interrogation following a suspect's request for counsel in the context of a
separate investigation." Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 440 n.5.
165. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441.
166. The Court's analysis of this point, as has been noted by Charles Weisselberg,
was "fairly unsatisfying." Charles D. Weisselberg, In the Stationhouse After Dickerson,
99 MICH. L. REV. 1121, 1133 (2001). Nonetheless, Weisselberg concludes that "Dick-
erson should put to rest the claim that Miranda's procedures are merely nonconstitu-
tional suggested guidelines." Id. at 1134.
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rule designed to protect the right, but would gut the content of the
Fifth Amendment guarantee itself.
III. SECTION 1983 AND THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT-
DECISIONS FROM THE COURTS OF APPEALS
A. Circuit Court Decisions
What have the Courts of Appeals concluded with respect to
whether coercing a statement from a person in custody is actiona-
ble under § 1983? While there is some lack of agreement about the
precise nature of the right violated, a majority of the circuits (the
Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits)
have held that coercing an involuntary statement is a constitutional
violation for which damages may be awarded under § 1983.167 In
addition, the D.C. Circuit has declared that a Fifth Amendment
constitutional violation takes place at the time of interrogation. 168
There is substantial agreement among the Courts of Appeals
that forcing a person in custody to make an involuntary statement
violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
None of the courts of appeals have held that a Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process violation based on a coerced statement does not
take place until the statement is offered into evidence.
The Second Circuit held, in Weaver v. Brenner,169 that obtaining
an involuntary confession was a due process violation actionable
under § 1983.170 The court concluded that it had been clearly es-
tablished in 1963 that the violation occurred at the time of the in-
terrogation: "[T]he constitutional violation is complete when the
offending official behavior occurs, and the refusal to admit at trial
statements made as a result of coercion is merely a corrective way
in which a court penalizes conduct that violates the Constitu-
tion."' 71 The court noted that it employed the Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process clause because the Supreme Court has continued
to analyze coercive interrogation techniques under it, despite hav-
ing held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
167. For an analysis of cases from these circuits, see infra notes 169-206 and accom-
panying text.
168. United States v. North, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (discussed infra notes
207-210 and accompanying text).
169. 40 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 1994).
170. Id. at 536.
171. Id. The court relied upon Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (dis-
cussed supra note 70 and accompanying text).
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tion applies to the states.17 The Second Circuit affirmed, in
Deshawn E. v. Safir,173 that Fourteenth Amendment due process
rights are violated by coercive interrogation itself: "A Miranda vio-
lation that amounts to actual coercion based on outrageous govern-
ment misconduct is a deprivation of a constitutional right that can
be the basis for a § 1983 suit ... even when a confession is not used
against the declarant in any fashion. '174
The Fourth Circuit, in Gray v. Spillman,'175 held that there is a
cause of action for a coerced confession by referring to both the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments without analyzing the basis for
locating the violation in either amendment. 176 Here, the court of
appeals reversed the district court, which had dismissed because
the plaintiff had not suffered any serious injury. 177 The Fourth Cir-
cuit concluded:
172. The court defined the test under the due process as "whether the suspect's
statements were made voluntarily, which depends upon examining all of the circum-
stances surrounding the interrogation to see if police overreaching overcame a sus-
pect's will and led to an involuntary confession, one not freely given." Weaver, 40 F.3d
at 536.
173. 156 F.3d 340 (2d Cir. 1998).
174. Id. at 348 (emphasis added). Without explicitly stating that it was making any
change in the Weaver definition of the violation, the court concluded:
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits self-incrimi-
nation based on fear, torture, or any other type of coercion.... The question
in each case is whether the conduct of "law enforcement officials was such as
to overbear [the defendant's] will to resist and bring about confessions not
freely self-determined." . .. The challenged conduct must be the "kind of
misbehavior that so shocks the sensibilities of civilized society as to warrant
a federal intrusion into the criminal processes of the States."
Id. (citations omitted). The court found that the interrogations of juveniles by police
officers when the juveniles appeared in family court were not so coercive as to
amount to due process violations. Id. at 348-49. The court relied on the fact that the
juveniles were not detained for a long period of time or subjected to prolonged ques-
tioning, they were not left alone with the police, but had their parent or guardian
present, there was no evidence that people were questioned in a weakened physical
condition, nor that they were physically coerced or deprived, or emotionally and psy-
chologically overwhelmed. Id.
175. 925 F.2d 90 (4th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff claimed that officers beat him during two
custodial interrogations. Id. Plaintiff's specific allegations were that he was hand-
cuffed to a chair with the cuffs so tightly that his hands swelled, that his request for an
attorney was denied, that he was kept in a room for several hours without food, water,
and cigarettes, that he was not allowed to use the restroom, that his face was shoved
into a wall, injuring his lip and knocking loose three teeth, that the officers made
racist remarks and threatened to "beat the hell" out of him, that they kicked his foot,
and that because of this, he eventually did make an incriminating statement. Id. at 90-
91.
176. Id. at 93.
177. Id. at 91.
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It has long been held that beating and threatening a person in
the course of custodial interrogation violates the Fifth and Four-
teenth amendments of the Constitution. The suggestion that an
interrogee's constitutional rights are transgressed only if he suf-
fers physical injury demonstrates a fundamental misconception
of the [Fifth and [F]ourteenth [A]mendments, indeed, if not
our system of criminal justice.' 78
The court further specified that proof of physical violence is not
necessary to establish a constitutional violation, and that psycho-
logical coercion would be sufficient for a § 1983 claim. 17 9
The Fifth Circuit has held that, at least where physical force is
used during interrogation, the plaintiff has a cause of action under
§ 1983. In Lewis v. Brautigam,1 80 the Fifth Circuit reversed the dis-
missal of a § 1983 cause of action, holding that "law officers who
exact confessions by violence can be held civilly liable.' 1 81 Signifi-
cantly, in Lewis, there had been no allegation of physical violence,
but rather the claim was that the plaintiff had been removed from
the county jail and sent to the state prison while awaiting trial,
where he was questioned daily for hours at a time and threatened,
178. Id. at 93 (citations omitted). The court relied on Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46, 54 (1947), and Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936). In Riley v.
Dornton, 115 F.3d 1159 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc), the court found that the plaintiff
had no cause of action because no "interrogation" had taken place. Id. at 1165-66.
The five dissenting judges would have found an interrogation, and went on to reaffirm
Gray on the ground that there is a due process "right to be free from physical violence
and coercion during custodial interrogation." Id. at 1169.
179. Gray, 925 F.2d at 94. The principle that physical violence is not required to
violate the rule against coerced self-incrimination is long-standing. In Bram v. United
States, 168 U.S. 532, 547-48 (1897), the Supreme Court explained that this was the
"well-settled nature of the rule in England at the time of the adoption of the constitu-
tion and of the Fifth Amendment."
Looking at the doctrine as thus established, it would seem plainly to be de-
ducible that as the principle from which, under the law of nature, it was held
that one accused could not be compelled to testify against himself, was in its
essence comprehensive enough to exclude all manifestations of compulsion,
whether arising from torture or from moral causes, the rule formulating the
principle with logical accuracy came to be so stated as to embrace all cases of
compulsion which were covered by the doctrine. As the facts by which com-
pulsion might manifest itself, whether physical or moral, would be necessa-
rily ever different, the measure by which the involuntary nature of the
confession was to be ascertained was stated in the rule, not by the changing
causes, but by their resultant effect upon the mind, that is, hope or fear, so
that, however diverse might be the facts, the test of whether the confession
as voluntary would be uniform, that is, would be ascertained by the condi-
tion of mind which the causes ordinarily operated to create.
Id.
180. 227 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1955).
181. Id. at 128.
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until he agreed to plead guilty to murder. 82 In Ware v. Reed,183 the
court held that the trial court had incorrectly instructed the jury
that officers could not use "excessive or unreasonable" force dur-
ing an interrogation. 184 The court of appeals concluded that "dur-
ing interrogation no physical force is constitutionally
permissible."' 85 The court continued:
We are firmly of the view that the use of physical violence
against a person who is in the presence of the police for custo-
dial interrogation, who poses no threat to their safety or that of
others, and who does not otherwise initiate action which would
indicate to a reasonably prudent police officer that the use of
force is justified, is a constitutional violation. 186
The Seventh Circuit has recognized that coercive police interro-
gation may give rise to a § 1983 claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause. Thus, in Duncan v. Nelson,187
the court specifically held that where a plaintiff can show that he
suffered damages (other than a later conviction) 88 from an interro-
gation and confession, he would have a cause of action under
§ 1983 to recover for them. 8 9 The court analyzed the problem as a
due process violation:
182. Id. at 126-27.
183. 709 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1983).
184. Id. at 353.
185. Id. at 351.
186. Id.
187. 466 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1972). Plaintiff complained that he had been interro-
gated while in custody on another charge. Id. at 941. He had been in the "hole"-
solitary confinement for the eighteen days immediately prior to the interrogation,
where he was required to sleep on the floor, receive one meal a day, and see neither
family nor friends. Id. When he was released from the hole the defendant officers
took him to a room where they handcuffed him to a chair and interrogated him for
several hours. Id. He was later convicted of murder, but the conviction was vacated
when an appellate court found his confession to have been involuntary. Id. at 941.
188. Id. Here the court concluded that plaintiff could not recover damages for his
conviction and incarceration for several reasons. Id. at 942. The district court had
ruled that the actions of the trial judge in admitting the evidence was a superseding,
intervening cause for which the police could not be held liable. Id. The court of
appeals considered the argument that the officers might have foreseen that the fruits
of their allegedly unlawful labors would be admitted into evidence, but it found this
argument untenable. Id. The court then reasoned that even if defendants should
have foreseen the admission of the evidence, plaintiff might still have been convicted
without the confession. Id. at 943. Finally, the court concluded that even if the con-
viction had been a proximate result of the defendants' acts, the particular sentence
imposed by the judge was not such a result. Id.
189. The court of appeals did not specifically describe the injuries other than a con-
viction that might result from a coercive interrogation. Id. It did conclude, however,
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For some time before the events here alleged, it had ceased to
be seriously questioned that the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment prohibited compulsion to incriminate one-
self by fear of hurt, torture, exhaustion, or any other type of
coercion that falls outside the scope of due process. . . .Al-
though the due process right allegedly violated here may be
found in the historical underpinnings of the Fifth Amendment's
prohibition against self-incrimination, "the essence of plaintiff's
claim," as Justice Frankfurter stated in his dissent in Monroe v.
Pape ... "is that the police conduct here alleged offends those
requirements of decency and fairness which, because they are
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' are imposed by the
Due Process Clause upon the states."'190
The court specifically rejected defendants' argument that physi-
cal violence is a necessary adjunct to the cause of action and held
that it is the totality of the circumstances that matters. 91
In Wilkins v. May, 192 the Seventh Circuit again recognized that
there are methods of interrogation forbidden by the due process
clause:
When the deprivation occurs in the course of a police interroga-
tion-a stage in the criminal justice process-it is fairly de-
scribed as a denial of due process, with no need to add the
oxymoronic "substantive." Interrogation so coercive is a form
of criminal procedure incompatible with the traditional liberties
of the subject. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 237 (1940),
and Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936), instance
the rack as a method of interrogation forbidden by the due pro-
cess clause. See also Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97
(1951). Interrogation at gunpoint is a comparable example-de-
that plaintiff's allegation that he suffered "pain, injury, and mental anguish" could
include more than the harm caused by conviction and incarceration. Id.
190. Id. at 944 (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 208 (1.961)) (other citations
omitted).
191. Id. at 945. The court relies in part on Justice Harlan's concurrence in Monroe:
"In fact, Justice Harlan in his concurrence in Monroe recognized the possibility that
psychological coercion leading to a confession could constitute damages under § 1983,
by using it as an example of an action under § 1983 which would ordinarily not fulfill
the requirements for a common law tort." Id. at 945 (citing Monroe, 365 U.S. at 196
n.5 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
192. 872 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff filed a Bivens action against two FBI
agents who arrested and questioned him in an interrogation room while he was seated
and handcuffed. Id. at 191. He claimed that one of them held a pistol two or three
inches from his head, pointed at his temple. Id. He was later prosecuted and con-
victed of bank robbery. Id. at 192. The plaintiff succeeded in getting one of the state-
ments he made during the interrogation suppressed, apparently because the motion
judge believed that the agent had indeed pointed a gun at him. Id. at 191-92.
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pending of course on the circumstances-even though it in-
volves no touching.'93
In Dickerson, the Supreme Court cited, with apparent approval,
the remedy provided by Wilkins.194
More recently, in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,'95 the Seventh Circuit
took for granted that coercing a statement would violate the rights
of the suspect: "Coercing witnesses to speak, rather than loosening
their tongues by promises of reward, is a genuine constitutional
wrong. Overbearing tactics violate the right of the person being
interrogated to be free from coercion .... In an earlier deci-
sion in the same case, the court had distinguished inappropriate
coercion both from a mere failure to give Miranda warnings and
from testimony compelled through immunity procedures:
Liability is appropriate, however, only when the constitutional
violation is complete, and causes injury, out of court. A prose-
cutor could be liable for depriving a suspect of food and sleep
during an interrogation, or beating him with a rubber truncheon,
or putting bamboo shoots under his fingernails. A prosecutor
could not be mulcted for conducting an interrogation without
Miranda warnings, because a suspect has no entitlement to the
warnings themselves. Miranda warnings protect the right to
counsel and have no independent stature. Interrogations with-
out Miranda warnings thus do not violate a suspect's rights; the
violation occurs only when the statements are used in criminal
proceedings.... There is likewise no violation in 'compelling' a
suspect to speak, where the compulsion does not involve prac-
tices forbidden on other grounds. The right not to be compelled
to testify against oneself is an evidentiary privilege. As the use
immunity cases show, the government may require a suspect to
193. Id. at 195 (parallel citations omitted). The court cautioned, however, that it
was not suggesting that the federal courts undertake "to monitor the details of police
interrogations, and to award damages whenever the police cross the line that sepa-
rates coercive from noncoercive interrogation." Id. It concluded that, "The relevant
liberty is not freedom from unlawful interrogations but freedom from severe bodily or
mental harm inflicted in the course of an interrogation." Id. The court went on to
decline to articulate a specific test for determining when a violation takes place:
We do not undertake to specify a particular threshold, a task that may well
exceed our powers of articulation. But it is a high threshold, and to cross it
Wilkins and plaintiffs like him must show misconduct that a reasonable per-
son would find so far beyond the norm of proper police procedure as to
shock the conscience, and that is calculated to induce not merely momentary
fear or anxiety, but severe mental suffering, in the plaintiff.
Id.
194. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 442 (2000).
195. 20 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 1994).
196. Id. at 794.
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speak, so long as it does not use the results against him....
Arguments based on Miranda and the self-incrimination clause
concern the conduct of the trial and therefore may not be the
basis of damages; coercive tactics that are independently wrongful
may, however, lead to awards.'97
The Eighth Circuit recently recognized a cause of action for a
coercive interrogation in Wilson v. Lawrence County:198 "Funda-
mental to our system of justice is the principle that a person's rights
are violated if police coerce an involuntary confession from him,
truthful or otherwise, through physical or psychological methods
designed to overbear his will." 199 The court noted that the "Su-
preme Court has long held 'that certain interrogation techniques,
either in isolation or as applied to the unique characteristics of a
particular suspect, are so offensive to a civilized system of justice
that they must be condemned under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' 200
The Ninth Circuit has held in Cooper v. Dupnik20 1 that coercing
an involuntary statement violates the due process clause whether
or not there is any attempt to use the statement in later criminal
proceedings.202 The court held, "The due process violation caused
by coercive behavior of law-enforcement officers in pursuit of a
confession is complete with the coercive behavior itself. 20 3
197. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 919 F.2d 1230, 1244 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other
grounds, 502 U.S. 801 (1991) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
198. 260 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff, a mentally impaired man, spent nine
years in prison for a murder he did not commit. Id. at 949. He pled guilty to the
crime after making a confession, which the court held there was sufficient evidence to
conclude was coerced. Id. He was pardoned after an investigation convinced the
governor of his innocence. Id.
199. Id. at 952. The court relied on Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206
(1960).
200. Wilson, 260 F.3d at 952 (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985) (em-
phasis added by Eighth Circuit opinion)).
201. 963 F.2d 1220 (1992). The plaintiff, although completely innocent of any
crime, had made statements that could have been used against him had he been put
on trial, for example, that he sometimes left the house alone late at night. Id. at 1236-
37.
202. Id. at 1247-48.
203. Id. at 1244.
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The Tenth Circuit held, in Rex v. Teeples,2 °4 that, "Extracting an
involuntary confession by coercion is a due process violation."2 5 It
further held that as a consequence, the improper interrogation was
actionable under § 1983.06
In United States v. North,2 °7 the D.C. Circuit stated that a Fifth
Amendment violation occurs at the time the statement is made.208
The court held that introducing evidence at trial based on immu-
nized testimony previously given to the grand jury would itself vio-
late constitutional rights, and the court distinguished cases in which
a statement is taken in violation of a person's constitutional rights
and later introduced in evidence.20 9 In the latter cases, the court
reasoned, the violation occurs when the statement is taken, and
whether it can be introduced in evidence later is a question of the
scope of the remedy.210
The circuit court decisions discussed thus far have involved cases
raising claims of direct violation of constitutional protections.
Other circuit court cases have involved § 1983 claims on the basis
of failures to give Miranda warnings. Most of these Circuit Court
cases involving civil claims under Miranda have discussed only
whether the mere failure to give Miranda warnings prior to ques-
tioning a suspect constitutes a sufficient basis for a claim under
§ 1983. The First, Second, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh
204. 753 F.2d 840 (10th Cir. 1985). Plaintiff was interrogated concerning a kidnap-
ping in a hospital following his attempted suicide. Id. at 841-42. He made incriminat-
ing statements and was convicted. Id. at 842. On the state appeal, the court held the
confession was involuntary as a matter of law. Id.
205. Id. at 843. The court relied upon Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513-15
(1963), and Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-23 (1959), for this proposition.
206. Teeples, 753 F.2d at 843.
207. 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990). This was the appeal of Iran-Nicaragua Contra
conspirator Oliver North from a criminal conviction. The court held that his rights
were violated when testimony was introduced against him which might have derived
from his previous immunized testimony and that the trial court had not held an ade-
quate Kastigar hearing. Id. at 947-48.
208. Id. at 948.
209. Id.
210. The court held:
[W]here Miranda warnings are not given, the constitutional violation occurs
independent of the grand jury. Whether the resulting confession can be used
derivatively by the grand jury or in subsequent proceedings is a matter of the
reach of the exclusionary rule, which is a function not of any rights of the
defendant but of a remedial balance factoring in the possible unreliability of
the confession and the need to deter the government from future violations
of Fifth Amendment rights.
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Circuits have all held that the failure to give Miranda warnings
does not by itself violate any constitutional rights.211
The far more significant question is whether coercing a state-
ment from a suspect in custody violates the Fifth Amendment, and
this issue has seldom received any detailed analysis. For example,
the Tenth Circuit in Bennett v. Passic, devoted less than a para-
graph to the issue and rejected out of hand the notion that taking a
statement in the absence of Miranda warnings, could violate the
Fifth Amendment.212 It did not separate the issue of actually co-
ercing a statement from the issue of the failure to provide warnings
and it discussed no Supreme Court decisions other than Miranda
itself.213 The Eleventh Circuit, in Jones v. Cannon, relied upon pre-
cedent from other circuits in concluding that questioning after fail-
ing to give Miranda warnings does not violate any substantive Fifth
Amendment rights.214 This court discussed no relevant Supreme
Court cases.21 5
The Eighth Circuit has indicated that the Fifth Amendment can
be violated only at trial, although the case where the court estab-
lished this principle did not make clear whether the plaintiff actu-
ally made a statement.21 6  The Second, Fourth, and Seventh
211. See, e.g., Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1277-78 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that
the officers claimed the plaintiff had confessed to a murder, although he denied mak-
ing a confession); Deshawn E. v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 347-48 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that
a class action does not discuss whether statements were made in particular cases);
Neighbor v. Covert, 68 F.3d 1508, 1511 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that Miranda warnings
are "a procedural safeguard rather than a right explicitly stated in the Fifth Amend-
ment"-officers did not give Miranda warnings, plaintiff made statements, but
charges were dismissed before trial); Mahan v. Plymouth House of Corr., 64 F.3d 14,
15 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting that the plaintiff had made no statement); Buckley v. Fitz-
simmons, 919 F.2d 1230, 1244 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 502 U.S. 801
(1991); Warren v. City of Lincoln, Nebraska, 864 F.2d 1436, 1442 (8th Cir. 1989) (en
banc) ("the remedy for a Miranda violation is the exclusion from evidence of any
compelled self-incrimination, not a section 1983 action"-the opinion reflects that
plaintiff was questioned without Miranda warnings, but not whether he made any
statements); Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1263 (10th Cir. 1976) ("No rational
argument can be made in support of the notion that the failure to give Miranda warn-
ings subjects a police officer to liability under the Civil Rights Act." The plaintiff had
made an incriminating statement.).
212. Bennett, 545 F.2d at 1263.
213. Id.
214. Jones, 174 F.3d at 1290-91.
215. Id.
216. Davis v. City of Charleston, 827 F.2d 317 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that the
failure to give Miranda warnings does not deprive one of constitutional rights as long
as no statements obtained from her were introduced at trial-the opinion does not
make clear whether any statement was taken from plaintiff); see Harris v. St. Louis
Police Dep't., 164 F.3d 1085, 1087 (8th Cir. 1998) (following Davis in concluding that
the mere failure to read plaintiff his rights was not actionable because he did not
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Circuits have suggested that the use of a statement at any criminal
proceeding would constitute a constitutional violation.217 In
Deshawn E. v. Safir,218 the Second Circuit entertained an argument
that the use of coerced statements for leverage in plea bargaining
would violate the Fifth Amendment, but ultimately did not reach
the issue because the case was a class action and the circumstances
were different among class members.219
By far the most thoughtful and thorough discussion among all
the lower court opinions of whether coercive interrogation violates
constitutional rights is found in the Ninth Circuit majority opinion
in Cooper v. Dupnik, holding that coercive interrogation itself vio-
lates the Fifth Amendment.220 The opinion, written by Judge Trott,
the former head of the Criminal Division of the Justice Depart-
ment, and a former United States Attorney from Southern Califor-
nia, squarely holds that the Fifth Amendment establishes a
substantive right to remain silent:
It is no accident that the first words out of a police officer's
mouth during a Miranda advisement must be: You have "a right
to remain silent." This warning is required as a procedural safe-
guard, but more importantly it expresses a substantive Constitu-
tional right-the right to remain silent rather than answer
incriminating questions posed by the police. It is wrong, there-
fore, to relegate this part of the advisement to the status of
"only a prophylactic device:" It is a prophylactic device, but it
expresses a substantive right.22 a
While recognizing the importance of the Miranda warnings, the
court clearly explained that it was not creating a cause of action for
allege that he was tried for a crime pursuant to his arrest; but the court also concluded
that the threat to use weapons and force against the plaintiff unless he confessed to a
felony, was actionable, as objectively unreasonable conduct under Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386 (1989)).
217. See Riley v. Dornton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1165 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (character-
izing the Fifth Amendment right as a "trial right," but also stating that it "applies only
when the accused is compelled to make a testimonial communication that is incrimi-
nating," which could imply use at a pre-trial proceeding); Weaver v. Brenner, 40 F.3d
527 (2d Cir. 1994) (using a coerced statement at the grand jury violates the Fifth
Amendment); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 919 F.2d 1230, 1244 (7th Cir. 1990), rev'd on
other grounds, 502 U.S. 801 (1991) (holding that the requirement that statement be
introduced at trial is limited to assertion of the Fifth Amendment claim-"Interroga-
tions without Miranda warnings thus do not violate a suspect's rights; the violation
occurs only when the statements are used in criminal proceedings.").
218. 156 F.3d 340 (2d Cir. 1998).
219. Id. at 347-48.
220. Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1243-44 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc); see CACJ
v. Butts, 195 F.3d 1039, 1041 (9th Cir. 2000).
221. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1239-40 (citations omitted).
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violations of Miranda safeguards unless officers also trespassed on
the actual right against self-incrimination.2 2
Cooper also held that coerced interrogation violates the Four-
teenth Amendment's proscription against extracting involuntary
statements at the time of interrogation.223 The court relied heavily
on the Supreme Court's opinion in Brown v. Mississippi,224 and
concluded:
The due process violation caused by coercive behavior of law-
enforcement officers in pursuit of a confession is complete with
the coercive behavior itself. As the [Brown] Court said, "it
would be difficult to conceive of methods more revolting to the
sense of justice than those taken to procure the confessions of
these petitioners ... ." The actual use or attempted use of that
coerced statement in a court of law is not necessary to complete
the affront to the Constitution. Contrary to the appellants' ar-
gument, this is not just a rule of evidence. All a court does in a
judicial context is apply the corrective where due process al-
ready has been denied. Our analysis on this point is confirmed
by numerous observations of the Supreme Court. In Innis, the
Court notes that "'[t]he fundamental import of the [Fifth
Amendment] privilege... [goes to] whether [the suspect] can be
interrogated. . ."' In Tucker, the Court states: "Where the
State's actions offended the ... Due Process Clause, the State
was then deprived of the right to use the resulting confessions in
court. ,
225
222. The court:
[S]tress[ed] again that this case does not deal with a product of police inter-
rogation that is just technically involuntary, or presumptively involuntary, as
those terms are used in Miranda jurisprudence, but with a product that was
involuntary because it was actively compelled and coerced by law-enforce-
ment officers during in-custody questioning, as those terms are used in Mi-
randa, Spano v. New York, Haynes v. Washington, and Mincey v. Arizona.
Our holding is consistent with the teaching of Michigan v. Tucker, and it
does not create a Fifth Amendment cause of action under § 1983 for conduct
that merely violates Miranda safeguards without also trespassing on the ac-
tual Constitutional right against self-incrimination that those safeguards are
designed to protect. This case does not establish a cause of action where
police officers continue to talk to a suspect after he asserts his rights and
where they do so in a benign way, without coercion or tactics that compel
him to speak. What we do confront is a case laden with police misconduct
that is "identical with the historical practices [of incommunicado interroga-
tion] at which the right against self- incrimination was aimed."
Id. at 1243-44 (citations omitted).
223. Id. at 1244-45.
224. 297 U.S. 278 (1936); see supra note 21 and accompanying text.
225. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1244-45.
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The circuit courts of appeals cases discussed above demonstrate
that the lower federal courts are in great disagreement about the
scope of protection afforded by the Constitution for the right to
remain silent. The Supreme Court now has an opportunity to re-
solve the confusion in this area in Chavez v. Martinez.
B. Importance of § 1983 Remedy
The decision of the Supreme Court in Chavez v. Martinez will be
of critical importance not merely as a matter of providing guidance
to the lower courts, but primarily because if the Supreme Court
were to exclude from civil rights liability unreasonable violations of
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, there would be no effec-
tive protection for the right to be free from coercive interrogation.
The exclusionary rule is not sufficient to provide such protection
because, in the first place, it is actually invoked in only a tiny frac-
tion of all serious criminal cases-over ninety percent of felony
cases are resolved by a plea where no trial is ever held.226
More importantly, in the absence of the Supreme Court's recog-
nition of civil liability for coercive interrogation practices, existing
Supreme Court cases actually provide an incentive for officers to
violate the Miranda protections and to interrogate suspects in vio-
lation of their constitutional rights.227 Once the police have ad-
vised a suspect of her right to remain silent and the suspect invokes
that right, the police gain nothing by ceasing interrogation. If they
stop questioning, the officers get no further information from the
suspect. On the other hand, if the police ignore the suspect's invo-
cation of her right to remain silent, the suspect may continue to
talk. Although the prosecution will not be able to use any state-
ments made at this point in its case in chief at the suspect's trial, it
would be able to use such statements to impeach the defendant
226. Between October 1999 and September 2000, of the 68,079 federal criminal
cases disposed of by plea or trial, 63,863 (93.8 percent) defendants pleaded guilty,
1235 (1.8 percent) were convicted or acquitted after bench trials, and only 2981 (4.4
percent) were convicted or acquitted after jury trials. STATISTICAL Div., ADMIN. OF-
FICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY SEP-
TEMBER 30, 2000, tbl. D-4. In 1996 of the 997,972 state felony defendants whose
cases were resolved by plea or verdict, 905,957 (90.8 percent) entered pleas of guilty
or nolo contendre, 54,474 (5.5 percent) had bench trials, and only 37,541 (3.8 percent)
had jury trials. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1998, at 432 tbl. 5.42. The "federal
numbers lump together felony and misdemeanor cases, [but] the overall felony per-
centages are probably about the same." Stephanos Bibas, How Apprendi Affects In-
stitutional Allocations of Power, 87 IowA L. REV. 465, 465 n.6 (2002).
227. See Clymer, supra note 28, at 503-05.
612
2003] YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT 613
were she to exercise her right to testify at trial.228 Moreover, the
officers can use the information supplied to develop further leads
and to find additional evidence and witnesses.229
That police departments are motivated to violate the Miranda
protections is more than a theoretical possibility; it is a reality that
has been documented both in litigation 230 and by empirical re-
search.23' In Cooper, the deputies who interrogated the plaintiff
suspected that he was the notorious "Prime Time Rapist" in Tuc-
son, Arizona. 32 The officers had decided in advance that when-
ever they had a suspect they would question him without allowing
him to exercise his right to silence and without granting any re-
quests he might make for an attorney.233 The officers deliberately
chose to violate Miranda, because although they knew the prosecu-
tion could not use any statements they obtained in its case in chief,
they hoped to foreclose the defendant from making an insanity de-
fense and from testifying at trial (reasoning that the statements
could then be used for impeachment).2 34 The plan to ignore Mi-
randa and the suspect's rights was known to the officers'
supervisors.235
CACJ v. Butts documented department-wide, policy driven, ver-
sions of the same strategy. Individuals and nonprofit associations
of criminal defense attorneys challenged the policies of the police
departments of Los Angeles and San Jose, California, that pro-
vided for the interrogation of suspects "outside Miranda" despite
228. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971); see also Oregon v. Hass, 420
U.S. 714, 727 (1975).
229. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443 (1974).
230. See, e.g., CACJ v. Butts, 195 F.3d 1039, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 2000); Cooper, 963
F.2d at 1220.
231. See, e.g., Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109,
112 (1998).
232. Cooper, 963 F.2d at 1223.
233. Id. at 1224.
234. Id. at 1225. The Cooper opinion opens with lengthy detailed quotations from
deposition testimony by the officers detailing their plans to ignore Miranda and their
reasons for doing so. Id. at 1224-33. A typical excerpt demonstrates the hard-boiled
cynicism of the officers concerning constitutional rights:
I continued the interrogation, hoping that it would be at least held voluntary
to keep him off the stand and to deprive him of the opportunity of forming
an insanity defense, and some of the questions went directly to the issue of
sanity. And so those were my motives for violating, trampling on his civil
rights and Miranda's, [sic] and the bottom line being, what are his damages.
I mean, I'm going to violate this American citizen's rights, but look at the
totality of the circumstances, the big picture, is it worth it, yeah.
Id. at 1227.
235. Id.
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the suspects' invocation of their right to remain silent and despite
their requests for an attorney. 236 The policies were set forth in po-
lice training programs and materials.237 The process of interrogat-
ing the suspects after they had attempted to exercise their right to
remain silent and requested attorneys is documented in the tran-
script of the interrogations set out in the Ninth Circuit opinion.238
The training materials in question and others directed to Califor-
nia law enforcement officers are described in a 1998 law review
article by Professor Charles Weisselberg, who was one of the plain-
tiffs' attorneys in CACJ. 3 9 Typical of what officers were being
taught are statements included in the conclusion from a training
bulletin published by the California District Attorneys Association:
As long as officers avoid overbearing tactics that offend Four-
teenth Amendment due process, the mere fact of deliberate
noncompliance with Miranda does not affect admissibility for
impeachment... And since Miranda is not of constitutional di-
mension, officers risk no civil liability for "benign" questioning
outside Miranda. Instead, they have "little to lose and perhaps
something to gain .. ,240
Weisselberg cites appellate decisions from three states other than
California, where officers admitted that they deliberately violated
Miranda's prescriptions to obtain information, and decisions from
thirty-eight other states where circumstances suggested deliberate
violations of Miranda based on the fact that the cases involved no
question of whether a suspect was in custody or had unambigu-
ously invoked her rights. 241 Based on his experience in California
and his research which suggested that deliberate violations of Mi-
randa were a "burgeoning practice," Weisselberg argues persua-
236. CACJ, 195 F.3d at 1041.
237. Id. The defense did not deny that the officers were trained to interrogate sus-
pects "outside Miranda," but argued that the individual defendants were protected by
qualified immunity from civil liability because they had relied on their training. Id. at
1049. The Ninth Circuit rejected this contention. Id. at 1049-50.
238. Id. at 1042-43. The following exchange sets out the essence of the officers'
approach:
[Suspect]: Well, if I'm being charged with something, I'd rather not have
anything else to say until I have an attorney.
[Officer]: Okay? Let me explain something to you, James. I'm going to con-
tinue to ask you questions. Now, you realize that you didn't waive your
rights. That means we can't use 'em in court.
Id. at 1044.
239. See Weisselberg, supra note 231, at 133-38.
240. Id. at 133-34 (citations omitted).
241. Id. at 137-38.
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sively that the exclusionary rule is insufficient to protect Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.242
The limited number of situations in which the exclusionary rule
is available, coupled with incentives for the police to ignore protec-
tions against coercing involuntary statements, compels the conclu-
sion that a recognition of the availability of § 1983 remedies for
coercive interrogation practices is absolutely essential.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court cannot decide that there is no cause of ac-
tion under § 1983 for damages caused by coercive interrogation
practices without turning its back on a large body of its own juris-
prudence and on the deeply rooted cultural and political expecta-
tions of American citizens who trust that they have a meaningful
constitutionally protected right to remain silent when in police cus-
tody. Recognition of a § 1983 cause of action is necessary to sup-
ply an effective deterrent to police tactics that ignore the right to
remain silent. Such a recognition by the Supreme Court would be
an important historical step in securing the liberty promised by the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the Four-
teenth Amendment due process clause.
242. Id. at 139-40.
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